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CAPPING INCENTIVES, CAPPING INNOVATION,
COURTING DISASTER: THE GULF OIL SPILL AND
ARBITRARY LIMITS ON CIVIL LIABILITY
Andrew F Popper*
INTRODUCTION
Limiting liability by establishing an arbitrary cap on civil damages is
bad public policy. Caps are antithetical to the interests of consumers
and at odds with the national interest in creating incentives for better
and safer products. Whether the caps are on noneconomic loss, puni-
tive damages, or set for specific activity, they undermine the civil jus-
tice system, deceiving juries and denying just and reasonable
compensation for victims in a broad range of fields.
This Article postulates that capped liability on damages for offshore
oil spills may well have been an instrumental factor contributing to the
recent Deepwater Horizon catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico. More
broadly, it argues that caps on damages undermine the deterrent ef-
fect of tort liability and fail to achieve economically efficient and so-
cially just results.
II. FEDERAL AND STATE LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY
A. The Presumptive Rationale for Caps
At some point in the last few decades, the argument surfaced that
the potential for tort liability does not have a meaningful effect on
behavior.' Belief in this counterintuitive notion may explain the
proliferation of tort reform measures, including caps on liability, in
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. Thanks are due to
the American Association for Justice Robert L. Habush Endowment for its generous support
and to American University, Washington College of Law students Allyson Valadez, Katie Lees-
man, Lucia Rich, and Jonathan Stroud for their valuable assistance.
1. The premise is not subtle: "[Tihe tort system produces low incentive[s] to engage in safe
behavior." Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37
UCLA L. REV. 439, 476 (1990); see also Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO
ST. L.J. 469 (1987); David G. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 665, 666-68 (1985); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and
Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1980); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 870 (1998) (arguing
that punitive damages might not affect corporate behavior since they tend to punish sharehold-
ers, not individuals within the defendant corporation); John A. Siliciano, Corporate Behavior
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the United States.2 What is more difficult to explain is how one who
thinks through the reality of civil litigation, adverse judgments, and
punitive damages can accept as credible the idea that sanctioning mis-
conduct has little or no effect on those who engage in misconduct or,
more to the point, on others contemplating similar action.3 To believe
that civil liability is simply part of doing business, a cost bred into the
price of goods and services, and not a factor influencing behavior, is to
engage in the tort reform fantasy that caps on liability, whether for
punitive damages or noneconomic losses, do not make accidents more
likely, nor do they place the public at risk.4 This Article rejects out-
right that perspective.5 While recognizing the important and expan-
and the Social Efficiency of Tort Law, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1820 (1987) (arguing that corporations
are not deterred by the prospect of liability).
2. See George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987);
Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 558 (1985); William
H. Rodgers, Jr., Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Rationality in Tort Theory, 54 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 16-23 (1980) (claiming that individuals are not deterred by the prospect of liability); see
generally THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION
(Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
3. See Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L. REV.
157, 198 (1998) ("[AIII cases present the potential that a liability determination will affect future
cases .... ); Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm
in the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 685 (2008) ("Damage awards modify future
behavior indirectly by providing disincentives for future conduct that is unduly risky."); Jon D.
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipu-
lation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1512-14 (1999) (surveying and assessing behaviorism argu-
ments); see generally George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON.
526 (1970) (discussing the potential of sanction to increase the likelihood of lawful behavior);
James Andreoni et al., The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 893, 894 (2003) (asserting that the threat of a large sanction can be an economically
efficient influence on behavior).
4. Perhaps this precept is founded on the idea that behaviorism is outright wrong. See PETER
W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 70-72,224-27 (1988)
(arguing that the tort system fails to achieve its objectives-with the exception of providing
compensation for attorneys); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence, 47 Nw. U.
L. REV. 855, 865-66 (1953) ("[D]eterrence and reformation . .. serve only to conceal the truth,
that the scheme of punishment is a barbaric system of revenge .... ); Paul Zador & Adrian
Lund, Re-Analysis of the Effects of No-Fault Auto Insurance on Fatal Crashes, 53 J. RISK & INS.
226, 236-41 (1986) (asserting that fault-based liability does not promote safety). These works
seemingly deny the force of behaviorism, a most fundamental notion regarding the regulation of
conduct. For the opposite, see C.B. FERSTER & B.F. SKINNER, SCHEDULES OF REINFORCEMENT
7-11 (1957), and see generally B.F. SKINNER, ABOUT BEHAVIORISM (1974) (claiming that
humans and other species act to avoid pain or punishment).
5. This Article focuses on caps on damages, both for noneconomic losses and punitive dam-
ages, and discusses both interchangeably. Both have the virtue of inexact prediction-namely,
those producing goods and services cannot shift the cost of either type of damages into the price
they charge. Accordingly, neither punitive nor noneconomic damages can be passed along fully
to consumers, and so both must come from the defendant's assets or the defendant's insurance.
In the parlance of tort reform, both are experienced by defendants as a sanction, notwithstand-
ing the differences in standards of proof required for punitive damages as opposed to
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sive discussion regarding the goals and purposes of tort law and the
public effect of tort judgments, it is a fair assumption that behavior is
affected by the realistic potential of civil liability, particularly when
the precise quantum of damages is not precisely predictable. 6
Presumably, one could ask if there are readily available data regard-
ing standards of behavior, best practices, or criteria for acceptable
conduct. In a common law country that permits courts to issue unpub-
lished opinions and where many disputes are settled without disclos-
ing the terms of the settlement, have the rules of behavior become
inaccessible? Do companies and individuals engage in behavior found
to be the basis for civil liability because they are innocently ignorant
of the case law, regulations, statutes, and industry standards?7 From
noneconomic losses. While there is a debate about the ex ante deterrent effect of noneconomic
damages, it is hard to take seriously the contention that punitive damages do not have an effect
on similarly situated market participants. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597-98 (2006)
(endorsing the notion that civil liability can be a deterrent to misconduct); Moskovitz v. Mt.
Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331, 343 (Ohio 1994) ("If [a prohibited act] is to be tolerated in our
society, we can think of no better way to encourage it than to hold that punitive damages are not
available . . . . We should warn others to refrain from similar [unacceptable] conduct and an
award of punitive damages will do just that."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 908(1) (1979) ("Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages,
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others
like him from similar conduct in the future."); Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages:
Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 647-48 (1980) ("Whenever a civil court
resolves the conflicting claims [it] enforces standards of behavior.... [And] must achieve a result
that protects the interest of society.... Inflicting punishment for past acts, however, tends also to
control future behavior .. . [o]thers in a similar position will wish to avoid the unpleasant conse-
quences of such acts in the future. Punishment, therefore, cannot be separated from deter-
rence." (footnotes omitted)); Leslie E. John, Comment, Formulating Standards for Awards of
Punitive Damages in the Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 2033, 2053 (1986);
("Punitive damage awards ... deter other potential offenders.... [D]eterrence brings about a
positive gain to society through the reduction of future misconduct. Awards of punitive damages
act to control future behavior-and thus to enforce desirable social norms-by raising the costs
of such misconduct.").
6. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcoNoMic ANALYSIS
24-35 (1970) (discussing the deterrent effect of tort liability); George P. Fletcher, Remembering
Gary-and Tort Theory, 50 UCLA L. REV. 279 (2002) (connecting Aristotle's corrective justice
theory and the stated goals of modern tort law with the scholarship and wisdom of Professor
Gary Schwartz); John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 544-53
(2003) (reviewing tort theory including the notion that economic deterrence is among the theo-
retical precepts used to explain tort law); Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX.
L. REV. 1 (1959); Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise II, 38 TEX. L. REV. 257 (1960)
(arguing that deterrence of misconduct is a fair presumption when tort law is seen as public law);
see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAw 4-7, 58, 161-62 (1987) (tort judgments deter future misconduct); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed
Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801,
1828 (1996) (characterizing tort law as a deterrent force as well as a mechanism for compensat-
ing those injured by acts that were not deterred).
7. At most, one could argue that the practice of designating a judicial opinion "unpublished"
cuts into the anticipated ex ante consequences of opinions. For a discussion of the unpublished
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the perspective of this Article, the answer is a resounding "no." To
the contrary, legal standards have never been more available.8 Mis-
conduct occurs not because the actors are unaware of standards-it
occurs because all too often, the consequences of misconduct are
known, predictable, and easily passed along to consumers, patients,
and the public. Caps, in that sense, undercut the import of the com-
mon law, legislative enactments, regulatory pronouncements, and
evolving industry standards.
The second half of this Article discusses directly the stark reality of
artificial limitations on civil judgments: caps dilute the beneficial de-
terrent effect of tort law, produce discernible market inefficiency, and
exact a disproportionate cost on vulnerable populations. The starting
point, however, is to look at the caps landscape at the state and fed-
eral level and, thereafter, assess whether two well-known catastrophic
events (the blowout of the Macondo well and resulting explosion of
the Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico and the Exxon Valdez
oil spill in Prince William Sound) were made more likely by pre-ex-
isting limitations on liability.
B. The Caps Landscape
For at least the last thirty-five years, both the states and the federal
government have imposed caps on civil liability. At the state level,
caps tend to be non-differentiated by activity (with the exception of
medical malpractice) and are imposed across-the-board on classes of
damages-for example, a cap on punitive damages or a cap on
noneconomic loss.9 At the federal level, caps tend to target a specific
activity or a particular industry.
opinion phenomenon, see Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-Prece-
dential Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755 (2003); David R. Cleveland, Draining the Morass: End-
ing the Jurisprudentially Unsound Unpublication System, 92 MARO. L. REV. 685 (2009); Penelope
Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1435 (2004); Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm Und Drang
over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429 (2005). The dispute
over the citation to unpublished opinions has been addressed in part by Federal Rule of Appel-
late Practice 32.1: "A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions,
orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been ... designated as 'unpublished,'
'not for publication,' 'non-precedential,' 'not precedent,' or the like . FED. R. APP. P.
32.1(a)(ii).
8. Since many judicial opinions, statutes, regulations, and industry standards are instantly
available at no cost online as well as through numerous proprietary websites-for example, Lex-
isNexis and Westlaw-there is little to the assertion that there are vast unknown segments of
common law jurisprudence, legislative mandates, regulatory obligations, or industry standards.
9. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (2010); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1902, -1903 (2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42 (2008); Morrr. CODE
ANN. § 25-9-411 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-42-02 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11
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The $75 million cap on damages set by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA) (central to this Article), the Price Anderson Act (setting a
$500 million limit on liability for harms caused by nuclear power inci-
dents), and the 1997 Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act (setting
a $200 million cap on liability for commuter rail incidents) are exam-
ples of industry-specific limitations on liability set by Congress.10 Ar-
bitrary limitations" of this type reduce accountability, undermine
deterrence, and more often than not, fail to keep pace with actual
costs, including inflation.12
The focal point for this Article is the April 20, 2010 rupture of the
Macondo well and the resulting explosion of the rig platform Deepwa-
ter Horizon that killed eleven workers and resulted in the discharge of
nearly 200 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. The stupen-
dous damage caused by the explosion and subsequent discharge of oil
is covered by the federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).13 OPA was
supposed to lessen the risk of spills by creating strict liability for those
spills' 4 and mandated the creation of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
(OSLTF) to cover the costs of future spills (with the corpus to be paid
by those in the petroleum industry).' 5 OPA also mandated that those
(1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-410 (LexisNexis 2010). There are similar caps with differing
liability limitations: for example, a $400,000 cap, Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2008), and a
$350,000 cap, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B (LexisNexis 2008).
10. See Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997, 49 U.S.C. § 24101 (2006); Oil Pollu-
tion Act of 1990 (OPA), 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006); Price Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006).
11. Caps imposed by Congress go well beyond oil spills and nuclear power plants. Damages
are capped for violations of civil rights, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)
(A)-(D), for so-called Y2K harms associated with the millennial change, 15 U.S.C. § 6604(b)(1)
(2006), and for a host of other areas.
12. California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA), CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2005), is an example of a law that caps liability and limits severely the
just recovery of patients harmed by medical malpractice. The non-indexed MICRA cap has not
kept pace with inflation and has unfairly affected women and minorities. See Amanda Edwards,
Comment, Medical Malpractice Non-Economic Damages Caps, 43 HARV. J. ON LEols. 213, 219
n.42 (2006) (claiming that the MICRA Deprives injured patients of full relief); but see Richard
E. Anderson et al., Effective Legal Reform and the Malpractice Insurance Crisis, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'v L. & ETHcs 343, 350 (2005) (stating that since it passed the MIRCA "California
has had a stable insurance environment").
13. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762.
14. The most recent and most comprehensive article on litigation options following the Deep-
water Horizon disaster is Stephen Gidiere, Mike Freeman & Mary Samuels, The Coming Wave
of Gulf Coast Oil Spill Litigation, 71 ALA. LAW. 374 (2010).
15. For determining those to whom OPA applies, see The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
33 U.S.C. § 2701(32). The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) provides resources for re-
moval costs and some types of damages for spills covered under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c), and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761,
2702(a). The terms delineating the OSLTF are set out in § 9509 of the Internal Revenue Code at
I.R.C. § 9509 (2006). For a detailed discussion of the use of the OSLTF for oil spills, see gener-
ally U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OIL SPILL LIABILITY TRUST FUND (OSLTF) FUNDING
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injured in a spilll6 seek redress through the polluters before accessing
the fund.17
Individuals and governmental entities are covered under OPA-
with the following fundamental and critical caveat: There is a $75 mil-
lion cap per incident, outside of willful or reckless behavior.' 8 If the
actions of the polluter turn out to be willful or grossly negligent,19 the
cap may not apply.20 There is another scenario in which the cap
would not apply: If a victim of the spill can fashion a state common
law claim apart from OPA and fend off the predictable attack based
on preemption, then state common law applies.
FOR OIL SPILLS, available at http://www.uscg.millnpfc/docs/PDFs/OSLTF_-Funding-forOil
Spills.pdf. For a general discussion of the OSLTF, see The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, Bu-
REAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION & ENFORCEMENT, http://www.gomr.boemre.
gov/homepg/regulate/regs/laws/osltf.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011), and The Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund (OSLTF), U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.uscg.millnpfc/About-
NPFC/osltf.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2011) ("The OSLTF has two major components. The Emer-
gency Fund is available for Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSCs) to respond to discharges
and for federal trustees to initiate natural resource damage assessments. The Emergency Fund is
a recurring $50 million available to the President annually. The remaining Principal Fund bal-
ance is used to pay claims and to fund appropriations by Congress to Federal agencies to admin-
ister the provisions of OPA and support research and development.").
16. This applies to private claimants and establishes a jurisdictional base for governments to
pursue those who cause damage to the natural environment. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2).
17. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(c). As to the kinds of damages recoverable, see 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). As
to the sequencing of recovery, see § 2713(a)-(b)(2) on filing interim claims.
18. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)-(c)(1).
19. In this event, claimants could seek to get punitive damages, although they may be limited
to damages that are on a 1:1 ratio with the actual losses or compensatory damages. See Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). If a basis for a claim is outside OPA, it would likely
be governed by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003),
which suggests a limit on punitive damages of nine times compensatory damages and a norm of
four times compensatory damages.
20. The applicability of the $75 million cap to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill is currently in
litigation. In a suit filed by the U.S. Justice Department on December 15, 2010, the government
alleged that actions leading to the Deepwater Horizon disaster allow for the imposition of liabil-
ity for damages under the Clean Water Act, "without limitation under the Oil Pollution Act."
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Announces Civil Lawsuit
Against Nine Defendants for Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Dec. 15, 2010) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2010/December/10-ag-1442.html. The suit alleges that
those responsible for the operation of the Macondo Well and Deepwater Horizon rig failed
to take necessary precautions to keep the Macondo Well under control ... [failed] to
use the best available and safest drilling technology to monitor the well's conditions ...
[failed] to maintain continuous surveillance [and failed] to use and maintain equipment
and material that were available and necessary to ensure the safety and protection of
personnel, equipment, natural resources, and the environment.
Id. The complaint is captioned United States v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc. Complaint at
1, United States v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc., No. 2:10CV04536, 2010 WL 5094310 (E.D. La.
Dec. 15, 2010) (No. 2:10CV04536). In addition to federal claims, OPA created the possibility for
states to pass laws allowing relief beyond the federal statute, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)(A) ("[O]r
under State law . . . ."), although United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 105 (2000) suggests that
such statutes may well be preempted by OPA.
980
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When an incident occurs in which the damages outstrip federally
imposed liability limits, such as the Deepwater Horizon blowout in the
Gulf of Mexico or the September 12, 2008 Metrolink crash in Chats-
worth, California, 21 from a victim's perspective, the first impulse often
is (and ought to be) to push for a proposal to increase the cap to cover
the real losses. Such initiatives raise the issue of the efficacy and con-
stitutionality of any amendment that retroactively changes the dam-
age cap and permits a victim to be fully compensated for past harms at
a level in excess of the cap.
Retroactive revision is certainly possible (and essential to protect
those harmed and to allocate costs and responsibility in a fair and just
manner), though it is far better public policy to avoid such arbitrary
limitations altogether. Only if legislation is written to anticipate retro-
active amendment will an amendment raising limits retroactively have
a strong chance of being upheld.22 Conversely, if there is nothing in
legislation authorizing or anticipating future adjustments, the retroac-
tive legislation needed to repair the injustice occasioned by a cap may
fail. The fixed nature of most caps renders them inherently obsolete;
unless Congress has anticipated the need for review and adjustment of
the caps, they are ossified and almost instantly outdated.23
Even if one proceeds with a state common law claim 2 4 and avoids
the federal limitation on liability, the state law on damage limitation
may be far more restrictive than the caps under OPA.
21. See Joel Rubin, Ann M. Simmons & Mitchell Landsberg, "Total Destruction": At Least 15
Dead in Metrolink Crash, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2008, at Al.
22. In Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988), the Court noted
that "[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law. Thus, congressional enactments and administrative
rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result."
The challenge of retroactivity has been considered by the Court on a number of occasions. See,
e.g., Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964); Claridge Apartments Co. v. Comm'r, 323
U.S. 141, 164 (1944); Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435, 439 (1935); Brimstone R.R. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 104, 122 (1928); United States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 276 U.S. 160, 162-63
(1928).
23. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTs & JUD. PROC., §§ 11-108, 3-2A-09 (LexisNexis 2006) (including
periodic increases to account for changes in costs and inflation). The legislation affecting rail
disasters does not contemplate the inevitable changes in costs or inflation. In response to the
Chatsworth rail disaster mentioned above, a bill was introduced to increase the limits on the
Amtrak cap to $500 million. See H.R. 6150, 111th Cong. (2010). The bill would "amend the
limitation on liability for certain passenger rail accidents or incidents under section 28103 of title
49" retroactively, applying the new limits (should the bill become law) back from September 12,
2008. Id.
24. There is a provision in OPA that suggests the possibility of a state common law claim. See
33 U.S.C. § 2718(a)(2) (dealing with OPA's relation to other laws). Section 2718(a)(2) states,
"Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 shall . . . affect, or be construed or interpreted
to affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of any person under the Solid Waste
Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.) or State law, including common law." 33 U.S.C.
§ 2718(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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The relentless push to cap damages at the state level has met con-
siderable success if measured by the range and number of state laws
that impose caps on liability. Perhaps it is a matter of sheer political
force-and financial resources. 25 When well-financed manufacturing
and retail interests, health care and pharmaceutical interests, and mul-
tinational energy and resource businesses demand caps from the legis-
lators they support, the political system seems to stumble all over
itself in a frenzied quest to limit civil liability.
Some states legislatures (for example, in Ohio) have passed dam-
age-cap legislation only to have it found unconstitutional, then rein-
stated that legislation, only to have it found unconstitutional for a
second time, and then reinstated it once again. 26 With several notable
exceptions, 27 most states have considered or adopted a cap on civil
liability on punitive damages, noneconomic damages, or both. These
restrictions are defended on the ostensible premise that such limits on
recovery "reform" the civil justice system.28 Similarly, dozens of bills
have been proposed in Congress designed to impose a national cap on
25. The force of resources may become even more pronounced after the Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010) decision, which removes certain long-standing
regulatory barriers on corporate political contributions.
26. Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 771 (Ohio 1991) found the Ohio law unconstitutional.
The legislature passed a new version and in Ohio ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v.
Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1091 (Ohio 1999), the law was found unconstitutional once again.
The current capping statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (LexisNexis 2010), has not yet
been found unconstitutional, though it has been limited in Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880
N.E.2d 420, 430 (Ohio 2007) (holding that the cap does not apply if the plaintiff suffered
"[p]ermanent and substantial physical deformity, loss of use of a limb, or loss of a bodily organ
system" (alteration in original) (quoting OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.18(B)(3)(a)-(b))).
27. Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability Ac-
tions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 417, 432-58 (2004);
see also Damian Stutz, Note, Non-Economic-Damage Award Caps in Wisconsin: Why Ferdon
Was (Almost) Right and the Law Is Wrong, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 105, 124 nn.137-38.
28. Professor Ronen Avraham catalogued various tort reform initiatives at the state level in
Ronen Avraham, An Empirical Study of the Impact of Tort Reforms on Medical Malpractice
Settlement Payments, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 183 (2007). States are bombarded with proposals to
limit liability on a regular basis, for example, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia have all had repeated tort reform bills introduced into their
legislatures. The following is a non-exhaustive list: H.B. 779, 2007 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007); S.B.
508, 2007 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007); H.B. 48, 2007 Leg., 422nd Gen. Assem. (Md. 2007); H.B. 816,
2006 Leg., 421st Gen. Assem. (Md. 2006). Massachusetts: S.B. 686, 185th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2007);
S.B. 955, 185th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2007). New Jersey: S.B. 671, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006);
Assem. B. 721, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006). New York: S.B. 4149, 2007-08 Leg., 230th Sess.
(N.Y. 2007); Assem. B. 8066A, 2007-2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007). Oregon: S.B. 655, 74th
Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). Pennsylvania: S.B. 678, 2007 Gen. Assem., 2007 Sess. (Pa.
2007). Virginia: S.J. Res. 90, 2006 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006); H.J. Res. 183, 2006 Reg. Sess. (Va.
2006).
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civil liability.29 These initiatives are transparent: They protect wrong-
doers, profit insurance interests, and undermine public safety.
Tort reform has had many goals that involve the complete elimina-
tion of certain features of the civil justice system such as strict liability,
joint and several liability, retailer liability, and punitive damages. 30
However, it is in the domain of punitive damages and limitations on
recovery for noneconomic losses3' where those seeking to limit ac-
countability have had their most stunning successes. With the excep-
tion of a few states, caps of one type or another limit damages
throughout the United States.32
Disputes regarding the constitutionality of caps that end up in court
are common33 and not surprising: There is fundamental disagreement
29. Paul J. Barringer, III, A New Prescription for America's Medical Liability System, 9 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & PoL'y 235, 244-49 (2006). Looking at the ten years between 1996 and 2006,
Congress made several attempts for tort reform on the federal level. The following federal tort
reform proposals were among those considered: H.R. 3103, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 956, 104th
Cong. (1996); H.R. 1091, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2242, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2563, 107th
Cong. (2001); S. 812, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 4600, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 5, 108th Cong.
(2003); S. 2061, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 11, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2207, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R.
4280, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 534, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 366, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 367, 109th
Cong. (2005); S. 354, 109th Cong. (2005); Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act, S. 1337, 109th
Cong. (2005); H.R. 5, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 22, 109th Cong. (2006). See also Avraham, supra
note 28, at 183. Often discussions of federal caps are based on language in a 1993 report from
the Office of Technology Assessment. U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY, AsSESSMENT
IMPACT OF LEGAL REFORMS ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COSTS (1993) ("[C]aps on damages are
effective in lowering payment per paid claim and, hence, malpractice insurance premiums.").
30. John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort
Retrenchment, 38 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 1021 (2004).
In the 1970s insurance companies, tobacco interests, and large industry launched a po-
litical campaign . . . . Unlike previous reform efforts that sought to change rules of law
through case-by-case adjudication in the courts, the self-styled tort "reform" movement
pursued a much grander vision: transforming the cultural understanding of civil litiga-
tion . . . by attacking the system itself....
[A]dvocates seek to persuade the public through advertising and lobbying that the civil
justice system is corrupted ....
Id. at 1021 (footnotes omitted).
31. A typical description of noneconomic damages, using Wisconsin as a guide, is as follows:
"[Nion economic damage" means moneys intended to compensate for pain and suffer-
ing; humiliation; embarrassment; worry; mental distress; noneconomic effects of disa-
bility including loss of enjoyment of the normal activities, benefits and pleasures of life
and loss of mental or physical health, well-being or bodily functions; loss of consortium,
society and companionship; or loss of love and affection.
Wis. STAT. § 893.55(4)(a) (2009).
32. Only the following states do not cap damages: Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa,
Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Vermont. Glassman,
supra note 27, at 432-58. One group of scholars classified caps based on the dollar-value of the
ceiling on damages. See Charles R. Ellington et al., State Tort Reforms and Hospital Malpractice
Costs, 38 J.L. MED. & ETmcS 127 (2010).
33. The following cases upheld caps. Fed. Express Corp. v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 2d
1267 (D.N.M. 2002); Evans v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002); Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp.,
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on the value-or harm-of capping damages.34 What is in play with
capped damages is quite straightforward. In those states that have
imposed a cap on noneconomic losses or punitive damages,35 a plain-
tiff cannot recover in excess of the capped amount, regardless of the
plaintiff's harms3 6 and regardless of the fact that a jury has determined
that the plaintiff has an entitlement to an amount in excess of the
695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985); Garhart v. Columbia/Healthone ex rel. Tinsman, L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571
(Colo. 2004); Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993); Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty.
Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115 (Idaho 2000); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind.
1980); Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1991); Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp. of Dillard Univ.,
607 So. 2d 517 (La. 1992); Adams v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1992); Gour-
ley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43 (Neb. 2003); Rose v. Doctors Hosp.
Facilities, 735 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135 (Utah 2004); Pul-
liam v. Coastal Emergency Servs., 509 S.E.2d 307 (Va. 1999); Verba v. Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406
(W. Va. 2001).
The following cases overturned caps on state constitutional grounds. Moore v. Mobile Infir-
mary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991); Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691
S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010); Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997); LeBron v. Got-
tlieb Mem. Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010); Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991);
Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1999); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711
(Wash. 1989). This represents a very limited list that spans 1987 to 2007.
34. The literature in the field is expansive. The following is a short list focused just on puni-
tive damages: Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as
Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 643-57 (2003); Theodore Ei-
senberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
743 (2002); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72
VA. L. REV. 139 (1986); Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages Are
Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1 (2004); Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to
Theory, 92 IoWA L. REV. 957, 961 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages
(with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2085 (1997); W. Kip Vis-
cusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (2001).
35. For a summary of punitive damage caps, see Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages, Criminal
Punishment, and Proportionality: The Importance of Legislative Limits, 41 CONN. L. REV. 109,
116 (2008), which provides a lucid summary of the common law landscape:
Nineteen states have enacted [punitive damage] caps of different forms, including stat-
utes that cap punitive damages as a fixed dollar amount, as a fixed ratio to the amount
of compensatory damages, as a fixed ratio subject to a dollar limit, and as a dollar limit
based on the income, profit from misconduct, or net worth of the defendant.
Id. Naturally, all states are bound by State Farm's constitutionally imposed single-digit multi-
plier limits discussed in the previous section.
36. There are literally thousands of cases where a plaintiff's damages are capped. While there
is nothing to be gained by listing them all, for further research, a few examples follow. J.M. v.
Hilldale Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 08-7104, 2010 WL 3516730, at *1, *16 (10th Cir. Sept. 10, 2010)
(involving claims arising from sexual relationship between student and teacher; jury award re-
duced because of a cap); Brown v. Crown Equip. Corp., 554 F.3d 34, 35 (1st Cir. 2009) (involving
a fatal forklift accident for which the family was awarded $4.2 million and the jury award was
reduced by almost two-thirds because of a cap); Paz v. Our Lady of Lourdes Reg'1 Med. Ctr., 341
Fed. App'x 971, 972 (5th Cir. 2009) (involving a medical malpractice action against doctors and
hospital and a jury award reduced because of a cap); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 934 S.W.2d
439, 460-63 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming the district court's reduction of a jury award because
of a cap); Seminole Pipeline Co. v. Broad Leaf Partners, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 730, 752 (Tex. Ct. App.
1998) (same); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Smith, 558 A.2d 768, 790 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989)
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cap.37 The consequences are blunt and troubling. First, caps deny just
and fair recovery of legal claims. One author suggests that "[c]aps on
non-economic damages reduce average awards by [65%] to [74%]."38
Second-and a focus of the second half of this research-caps under-
mine deterrence. 39
III. LIMITS ON LIABILITY FOR OFFSHORE AcrivITy: THE
DEEPWATER HoRIZON DISASTER AND THE
ExxoN VALDEZ SPILL
A. The Deepwater Horizon Disaster
Almost immediately after the blowout at the Macondo wellhead
more than a mile beneath the Deepwater Horizon rig, two questions
surfaced: Could this disaster have been avoided through the exercise
of due care? Did the legal environment, and specifically the $75 mil-
lion cap on liability in OPA and the limits on punitive damages the
Court imposed in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker40 play a role in making
this event more likely? 41
(involving a $7.8 million jury award for electrocution of a teenage girl due to PEPCO's gross
negligence that was reduced because of a cap from $500,000 to $350,000).
37. Jeffrey R. White, State Farm and Punitive Damages: Call the Jury Back, 5 J. HIGH TECH.
L. 79 (2005) ("Nowhere does the civil jury speak louder than when it awards punitive damages
against a defendant who has violated our common understanding of acceptable behavior. The
jury verdict speaks as the conscience of the community.").
38. Avraham, supra note 28, at 208.
39. See David A. Matsa, Does Malpractice Liability Keep the Doctor Away? Evidence from
Tort Reform Damage Caps, 36 J. LEGAL STUo. 143 (2007); Colleen P. Murphy, Determining
Compensation: The Tension Between Legislative Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REv. 345,
391 n.204 (1995); Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages' Iron Cage, 38 Lov. L.A.
L. REV. 1297, 1318-19 (2005); see also Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms' Winners and Losers:
The Competing Effects of Care and Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 910 (2008); Brandon
Van Grack, The Medical Malpractice Liability Limitation Bill, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 299, 310-11
(2005); Kathryn Zeiler, Turning from Damage Caps to Information Disclosure: An Alternative to
Tort Reform, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETmIcs 385, 389-90 (2005); Giana Ortiz, Comment,
Medical Malpractice Damage Caps-Constitutional Per Se in Texas, But at What Price? A Look
at Alternative Patient Compensation Schemes, 43 Hous. L. REV. 1281 (2006).
40. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (deciding that in maritime cases, puni-
tive damages must be assessed in relation to compensatory damages as opposed to the degree of
wrongfulness of the defendant's action and that those damages can, in most instances, be no
more than the amount of the compensatory damages; therefore, punitives and compensatory
damages must be in no more than a 1:1 ratio).
41. These are the two questions relevant to this analysis. Naturally, there are other factors of
great consequence that played a role in making this event more likely, not the least of which was
the apparent failure of the Department of Interior and its sub-agency, Minerals Management
Service (MMS), to demand compliance with all health and safety standards applicable to off-
shore drilling. See Juliet Eilperin, U.S. Exempted BP's Gulf of Mexico Drilling from Environ-
mental Impact Study, WASH. PosT ONLINE (May 5, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/04/AR2010050404118.html. MMS issued
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The first major study by BP suggests that this accident was the re-
sult of actions that were preventable.
The cement and shoe track barriers-and in particular the cement
slurry that was used . . . failed . . . . The results of the negative
pressure test were incorrectly accepted . . . the Transocean rig crew
failed to recogni[z]e and act on the influx of hydrocarbons into the
well .... After the well-flow reached the rig it was routed to a mud-
gas separator, causing gas to be vented directly on to the rig rather
than being diverted overboard . . . [t]he flow of gas into the engine
rooms through the ventilation system created a potential for igni-
tion which the rig's fire and gas system did not prevent; ... the rig's
blow-out preventer . . . should have activated automatically to seal
the well. But it failed to operate, probably because critical compo-
nents were not working.42
Initial governmental reports drew the same conclusion. Congressman
Edward J. Markey, senior member of the House Energy and Com-
merce Committee investigating the blowout, characterized BP's deci-
sion-making culture as follows: "When the culture of a company
favors risk-taking and cutting corners above other concerns, systemic
failures like this oil spill disaster result without direct decisions being
made or tradeoffs being considered." 43
categorical exclusions to approve BP's initial and revised exploration plans and approv-
als for the application for a permit to drill the Macondo well. Which means that instead
of completing a site-specific review of the environmental impacts as required by NEPA,
MMS instead relied on the earlier NEPA documents that were wrought with
inadequacies.
Jaclyn Lopez, BP's Well Evaded Environmental Review: Categorical Exclusion Policy Remains
Unchanged, ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS (Nov. 2010), http://elq.typepad.com/currents/2010/11/cur-
rents37-10-lopez-2010-1002.html#tp. A report from the Council on Environmental Quality ad-
vocated rethinking the continued use of categorical exclusions. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, REPORT REGARDING THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE'S NATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLICY ACT: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND PROCEDURES AS THEY RELATE TO
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 4-5 (Aug. 16,
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/20100816-ceq-
mms-ocs-nepa.pdf.
42. Press Release, BP, BP Releases Report on Causes of Gulf of Mexico Tragedy (Sept. 8,
2010), available at http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryld=2012968&contentld=7064
893; Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (Sept. 8, 2010), available at http://www.
bp.comliveassets/bpinternet/globalbp/globalbpuk-english/incidentresponse/STAGING/local
assets/downloads..pdfs/Deepwater HorizonAccident InvestigationReport.pdf.
43. Steven Mufson, Cost Didn't Drive Decisions on Oil Rig, Spill Panelist Says, WASH. POST,
Nov. 9, 2010, at A3. This statement is consistent with prior assessments of the disaster. Michael
Greenstone, A Built-in Incentive for Oil Spills, POLITICO (June 3, 2010, 4:50 AM), http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/0610/38068.html#ixzzOpnVCnS4U; John McQuaid, The Gulf of Mexico
Oil Spill: An Accident Waiting to Happen, YALE ENV'T 360 (May 10, 2010), http://e360.yale.edul
content/feature.msp?id=2272; Lisa Myers & Rich Gardella, Deepwater Horizon Rig: What Went
Wrong?, MSNBC.com (May 21, 2010, 7:40 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/clearprint/CleanPrint
Proxy.aspx?1297129421799. The Washington Post article focused on Commission counsel, Fred
H. Bartlit, who suggested that intentional "short-cuts" were not taken "for the sake of saving
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In September 2010, the National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (the Commission) reported
that there was knowledge of grave risk not addressed prior to the
blowout.44 After months of study, the co-chairman of the Commis-
sion, William K. Reilly, confirmed this assessment. Reilly character-
ized the events leading to the blowout of the Macondo well and the
explosion of the Deepwater Horizon as "a suite of bad decisions. . . ."
He noted there were "failed cement tests, premature removal of muds
underbalancing the well, a negative pressure test that failed but was
adjudged a success, apparent inattention, distraction or misreading of
a key indicator that gas was rising toward the rig. . . . [T]he story they
told is ghastly: one bad call after another."45 Reilly summarized the
environment on the rig and the decisions leading to the blowout:
"Whatever else we learned [there was] emphatically not a culture of
safety on that rig. I referred to a culture of complacency and speaking
for myself, all these companies we heard from displayed it."46
money." The statements of Mr. Bartlit turned out not to represent the views of the Commission.
The Post article sets out the background of Mr. Bartlit:
Bartlit, a litigator who has represented corporations on antitrust, patent infringement,
false claims and other complex matters, also represented President George W. Bush in
a Florida ballot case. . . . Bartlit defended General Motors' Allison Gas Turbine unit
against charges that its engines ignited a gas cloud that killed more than 160 people on
board the Piper Alpha oil rig platform in 1988.
Mufson, supra, at A3.
44. Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE JOINT INVESTIGATION
TEAM, http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/site/3043 (last visited Feb. 7, 2011); John M.
Broder, Companies Knew of Cement Flaws Before Rig Blast, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2010, at Al.
45. Hearing of the Nat'l Comm'n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill-
ing (Nov. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Nat'l Comm'n Hearing] (statement of the Honorable William K.
Reilly, Co-Chairman), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/page/hon-reillys-opening-
statement-nov-9-2010.
46. Id. The final report of the Commission, issued on January 11, 2011, affirmed Reilly's
conclusions.
The explosive loss of the Macondo Well could have been prevented. The immediate
causes of the Macondo Well blowout can be traced to a series of identifiable mistakes
made by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean that reveal such systematic failures in risk
management that they place in doubt the safety culture of the entire industry.. . . The
Deepwater Horizon disaster exhibits the costs of a culture ofcomplacency.... There are
recurring themes of missed warning signals, failure to share information, and a general
lack of appreciation for the risks involved.
NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP
WATER: THE GuLF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING (Jan. 2011) (em-
phasis added), available at https://s3.amazonaws.compdf finalDEEPWATERReporttothe
PresidentFINAL.pdf. One reporter who followed this disaster from its inception notes that the
final report makes clear that the disaster was the consequence of "fateful decisions ... mistakes
and failures . .. until the blowout was inevitable." Steven Mufson, BP, Transocean, Halliburton
Blamed by Presidential Gulf Oil Spill Commission, WASH. POST ONLINE (Jan. 6, 2011, 12:01
AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/05/AR2011010504631.
html.
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Concerning BP, its partners, and its subsidiaries, Reilly stated,
"[E]ach company is responsible for one or more egregiously bad deci-
sion[s]. . . . We are aware of what appeared to be a rush to completion
at Macondo. .. ."47 There is far more to learn about the causes of this
event and no doubt that data emerging from the litigation 48 surround-
ing this disaster will help pin down the root causes. However, the
early assessments, taken as a whole, make clear that something other
than optimal deterrence was operating before the wellhead blew. One
summary of the disaster notes insufficiencies in design, questionable
material selection, and failure to respond to early warning signs.49
The same report includes the following exchange between reporter
Lisa Myers and one of the country's leading experts on offshore oil
disasters, Dr. Robert Bea:
Dr. Robert Bea: There are time pressures that are extremely in-
tense. And there are economic pressures that are extremely intense.
Lisa Myers: So you saw a lot of cutting corners.
Dr. Robert Bea: Sure.50
BP's partner in the operation of the well was equally blunt. James
Hackett, CEO of Anadarko Petroleum, issued a statement several
months after the blowout asserting that BP's actions were willful and
grossly negligent and that BP "should pay the costs from the disaster
because of the reckless and unsafe way it drilled at the site."51
Within days of the Gulf disaster, anyone reading a newspaper, scan-
ning news online, or listening to broadcast news understood that OPA
47. Nat'l Comm'n Hearing, supra note 45.
48. John M. Hynes & Paige M. Neel, The Deepwater Horizon Blowout and Oil Spill-Who Is
Suing and Being Sued, How, Where and Why?, CLAUSEN MILLER (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.
clausen.com/index.cfm/falfirm-pub.article/article/41829cfc-724b-44f8-934d-elbd9elb59eflhe-
DEEPWATERHORIZONBlowoutAndOilSpillWholsSuingAndBeingSuedHow
WhereAndWhy.cfm ("[T]here are lawsuits filed in Florida, Alabama, Texas, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, California, New York, Oklahoma and Georgia."). Some of
these cases have been consolidated before the Multidistrict Litigation Panel, Judge Carl Barbier.
In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010,
Montanga v. BP Prods., MDL-2179 (S.D. Ala. 2011) (No. 1:10-607), availavle at http://www.jpml.
uscourts.gov/. There are also individual cases pending. See, e.g., Blue Water Yacht Sales &
Serv., Inc. v. Transocean Holding Inc., No. 1:10-cv-0024-KD-N (S.D. Ala. 2010); Moore v. BP
PLC, No. 1:2010-cv-00293 (S.D. Ala. 2010).
49. See Myers & Gardella, supra note 43.
50. Id.
51. Edward Klump, Anadarko Says Well Operator BP Should Pay for Spill (Update2),
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 18, 2010,8:17 PM), http://www.businessweek.comlnews/2010-
06-18/anadarko-says-well-operator-bp-should-pay-for-spill-update2-.html ("BP's behavior and
actions likely represent gross negligence or willful misconduct and thus affect the obligations of
the parties under the operating agreement . . (quoting James Hackett, CEO of Anadarko
Petroleum)).
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imposes a cap on civil liability for offshore oil spills. 52 As noted in the
previous section, the Act states, "[E]xcept as otherwise provided in
this section, the total of the liability of a responsible party under
§ 7202 of this title ... for an offshore facility except a deep water port
[is] 75 million dollars."53 This sum is to cover all damages to natural
resources, real property, personal property, subsistence (of obvious
consequence for all commercial uses in the Gulf), revenues, profits,
earning capacity, and public services. Along the same lines, everyone
following the disaster knew that this sum had to be insufficient. 54 Un-
known at the time was whether the limitation on liability was instru-
mental and affected the questionable decisions made by BP.
To be sure, offshore drilling is dangerous. Thus, liability is strict
under OPA-and those injured in such disasters should be fully com-
pensated. Although a public trust fund55 establishes a secondary
source for spills, it should be for those instances in which the defen-
dant cannot cover its losses, not as a profit-protecting mechanism for a
company engaged in highly risky behavior. The congressional testi-
mony on the Deepwater Horizon disaster confirms these concerns.
One witness (Kate Gordon from the Center for American Progress)
testified that BP could have prevented this blowout by installing a
$500,000 "acoustic blow out preventer." 56 Gordon testified that rais-
ing or eliminating the cap would have changed company behavior and
would not have resulted in the end of offshore drilling. The testimony
was supported throughout the hearing.57
Decisions regarding how and where to drill are and ought to be
based on whether the expected benefits exceed the expected costs.
The difference is that unlike other industries that do not have func-
tion-specific capped liability, excess liability costs do not have to be
part of the equation for offshore drilling.58 If an oil company knows
52. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006).
53. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), 33 U.S.C. § 2701; Price Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210 (2006).
54. In one of the first published studies of this disaster, the authors note that the "$75 million
dollar cap is not going to be nearly enough money to compensate for all the consequential dam-
ages that we are going to see." Kim Hollaender, Harvey M. Sheldon & Scott Summy, Under-
standing the BP Oil Spill and Resulting Litigation: An In Depth Look at the History of Oil
Pollution and the Impact of the Gulf Coast Oil Disaster (Aspatore Special Report 2010).
55. See 26 U.S.C. § 9503 (2006).
56. Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and
Related Statutes: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 111th Cong. (2010)
[Hereinafter House Liability Hearing], available at http://transportation.house.gov/hearings/
hearingDetail.aspx?NewsID=1235.
57. Id.
58. Id. (statement of Michael Greenstone, 3M Professor of Environmental Economics, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology).
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the maximum amount of damages it would have to pay for an oil spill,
it will decide whether to engage in risky behavior based solely on
profitability gains and risks.59
Companies participating in high-risk activities including offshore
drilling should have every incentive to maximize safety. Statutorily
capped liability has exactly the opposite effect. It is now fair to con-
clude that the cap on liability for offshore drilling played a meaningful
role in the decisions that led to this disaster.60 Oil spills are not com-
pletely preventable.6 ' However, there are ways to lessen risk-and
they can be costly. It is only logical that a company will not incur
those costs if it already knows the limits of its liability and has already
programmed those costs into its pricing structure.
As long as there are ships at sea, there will be accidents. We cannot
alter that fact. What we can strive to do, what our goal should be, is
to insure that these accidents are as infrequent as possible, and that
their consequences, to the ship, the personnel onboard, and to the
environment, are as harmless as possible. 62
It is fair to say that in the case of this disaster, the actions of BP were
not "as harmless as possible." 63 If a cap is set below the amount of
expected damage, this not only violates the victim's right to compen-
sation but also vitiates the full internalization of risks associated with
an activity.64 This phenomenon led to the following conclusion by As-
sociate Attorney General Thomas J. Perrelli during a Senate Energy
and Natural Resources Committee hearing: "'I don't think there
should be an arbitrary cap on corporate responsibility .... "'65
59. See id.
60. See House Liability Hearing, supra note 56 (statement of Thomas J. Perrelli, Associate
Attorney General).
61. Blair N.C. Wood, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Improper Expenses to Include in Reaching
the Limit on Liability, 8 APPALACHIAN J.L. 179, 182 (2009) ("Oil spills are inevitable and result
from equipment failure, human error, acts of God, and terrorism.").
62. Tammy M. Alcock, Comment, "Ecology Tankers" and The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A
History of Efforts to Require Double Hulls on Oil Tankers, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 97, 98 (1992).
63. Id.
64. See Michael Faure & Wang Hui, Economic Analysis of Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage, 37 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 179, 185 (2006); see also House Liability Hearing, supra note 56
(statement of Rep. Oberstar, Chairman, House Transportation & Infrastructure) (stating that
the cap effectively distributes the costs to taxpayers and away from those who caused the harm).
65. Joseph J. Schatz, Senators Find It Difficult to Agree on How to Address Oil Spill Liability
Cap, CQ TODAY, May 25, 2010 (quoting Associate Attorney General Thomas J. Perrelli). For
reasoning supporting this conclusion, see Matthew P. Harrington, Necessary and Proper, But Still
Unconstitutional: The Oil Pollution Act's Delegation of Admiralty Power to the States, 48 CASE
W. REs. L. REV. 1 (1997), and Patrick F. Nash, Note, The Adequacy of the Oil Pollution Act's
Compensation Scheme in the Case of a Catastrophic Oil Spill, 7 MN. L. & POL'Y 105 (1991).
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In effect, the cap ensures an economic model that includes public
subsidization of privately caused harms.66 To an extent, because oil is
currently an essential product, public involvement is not irrational.
"Because it is funded by a tax on all imported and domestic oil, the
OSLTF helps to ensure that the costs of oil spills are borne by 'all
users of oil.'" 6 7 However, public assistance in clean-up and recovery
is one thing-using public funds to "spare" oil companies from paying
their share of a direct and personal harm they caused by virtue of their
negligence is quite another. Companies should have to pay for dam-
ages they cause, just as individuals would. 68 This has been understood
as a necessary feature of the tort scheme for the last quarter century.
"The premise of an unlimited liability to the discharger is that the in-
jured party should be reimbursed completely by the party ultimately
responsible for the spill." 69 Removing the cap makes future disasters
less likely. At a minimum, review of the cap seems an obvious
choice. 70
In 2006, Michael Faure and Wang Hui demonstrated that the com-
pensation scheme for oil spills, and particularly the cap on liability,
was inherently inefficient and undercut the necessary deterrent effect
that full liability would provide. Writing purely from an economic
perspective, Faure and Hui were blunt: "[A] cap probably has more
negative effects (on the tortfeasor's incentives to take care) than ben-
efits (of additional care from victims)." 7^ "An obvious disadvantage
of a system of financial caps is that this will seriously impair the vic-
tim's rights to full compensation." 72
Notwithstanding the convincing work of Faure and Hui, there is a
contrary view of caps. Speaking generally (and not about OPA), in his
opinion in Exxon Shipping v. Baker,73 Justice Souter wrote, "The real
problem is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards." On this
point, reasonable minds can and do differ. However, based on the
findings regarding the Gulf spill and the other information discussed
66. See Mark T. Peterson, Comment, State Incentive Based Oil Tanker Regulation: An Alter-
native to Traditional Command-and-Control Regulation, 4 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 271, 301-02
(1999).
67. Harrington, supra note 65, at 13 n.43 (quoting S. Rep. No 101-94, at 6 (1989)).
68. See House Liability Hearing, supra note 56 (statement of Kate Gordon, Center for Ameri-
can Progress Action Fund).
69. Glen Fjermedal, Comment, Federal Oil Spill Fund Legislation: A Future Standard, 53 AL-
BANY L. REV. 161, 202 (1988).
70. See Gerald Karey & Herman Wang, US Attorney General Eyes Liability Cap Hike,
PLATrS OILGRAM NEWS, June 10, 2010, at 9.
71. Faure & Hui, supra note 64, at 194.
72. Id. at 185, 194.
73. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 472 (2008).
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above, it would seem clear that a certain level of unpredictability is
essential. It is understandable that those who produce goods and ser-
vices want to be freed of liability costs not covered up front by the
prices charged for those goods and services. Who would not want to
pass along all risks to consumers? However, it is precisely that uncer-
tainty that pushes producers to improve the quality of their output.
B. The Exxon Valdez
On March 24, 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground on
Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, spilling eleven million gallons of
crude oil and causing one of the worst environmental disasters in U.S.
history.74 This event led to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 discussed in
the previous section and generated a Supreme Court decision that im-
posed a dramatic limitation on maritime cases, including oil spills,
where punitive damages are sought.75 The Court held that punitive
damages must be assessed in relation to compensatory damages as op-
posed to the degree of wrongfulness of the defendant's action and that
those damages can, in most instances, be no more than the amount of
the compensatory damages (in other words, punitive and compensa-
tory damages must be in no more than a 1:1 ratio).76
This decision makes more likely risk-taking behaviors that can and
do lead to disaster. A recent article examining the Exxon Valdez spill
and the decision of the Supreme Court to slash punitive damages from
$2.5 billion to $500 million demonstrated the dangerous relationship
between capped or fixed damages and deterrence. "Exxon Ship-
ping's77 one-to-one cap unduly fetters punitive damages and will inter-
fere with deterrence and retributivist goals."78 Exxon Shipping must
be read in conjunction with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Campbell, which also required computation of punitive dam-
74. Noel Wise, Personal Liability Promotes Responsible Conduct: Extending the Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrine to Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement Cases, 21 STAN. ENV'T
L.J. 283, 330 (2002) ("Congress swiftly enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 in response to the
massive spill of approximately eleven million gallons of oil into Alaska's Prince William Sound
from the Exxon Valdez, which has been widely viewed as one of the worst environmental disas-
ters in history."); see also Jules Lobel & George Loewenstein, Emote Control: The Substitution
of Symbol for Substance in Foreign Policy and International Law, 80 Ci.-KENT L. REV. 1045,
1075 (2005) ("The Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound in 1989 was one of the worst
environmental disasters in American history, inciting a nationwide public protest, a massive vol-
unteer effort to assist in clean up, and the passage of the Oil Pollution Act in August of 1990."
(citing Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484)).
75. See Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 471.
76. Id. at 514-15.
77. Id. at 514.
78. Jeff Kerr, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker: The Perils of Judicial Punitive Damages Reform,
59 EMORY L.J. 727, 756 (2010).
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ages in relation to compensatory damages, using a substantive due
process analysis, and finding that more than a single-digit ratio (no
more than nine times compensatory damages) was inherently
suspect.79
The notion that punitive damages should be capped in relation to
compensatory damages is both irrational and at odds with 150-year-
old Supreme Court jurisprudence: "It is a well established principle of
the common law that ... a jury may inflict ... exemplary, punitive, or
vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of
his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plain-
tiff."80 This view is well expressed in the literature: "[T]he limits of
punitive damages have to do entirely with the heinousness of the
wrongful act; they have nothing to do with the size of compensatory
awards. Thus, we oppose proposals to cap punitive damages at some
small multiple of compensatory damages.""' It only makes sense that
"the heinousness of the offense ... is not measured by the magnitude
of harm."82
The Exxon spill was the result of actions that, by almost any mea-
sure and including the measure of the Supreme Court, were suffi-
ciently reckless and grossly negligent to justify the imposition of
punitive damages. 83 One law review note summed up the situation,
including the actions of the captain, Joseph Hazelwood, thusly:
Having just guzzled ten shots of liquor, Joseph Hazelwood, a life-
time alcoholic . . . realized that the boat was on course to collide
with an underwater coral reef. ... Hazelwood sped up the boat ...
abandoned his. . . post . . . leaving two unlicensed crew members to
navigate around the reef. The crew members failed to properly
make a turn, . . . the ship ran aground on the reef, [and] [e]leven
million gallons of crude oil gushed into Prince William Sound ....
[It was] determined that .. . Hazelwood had a blood-alcohol content
of approximately .241 . . . triple the legal limit . . . .84
Notwithstanding the abysmal record, the Exxon Court drastically
limited (or imposed a cap) on maritime punitive damages, a decision
79. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425-26 (2003).
80. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
81. Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1461 (1992).
82. Id. at 1432.
83. The findings in the Final Report of the Alaska Oil Spill Commission confirm that assess-
ment. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Alaska Oil Spill Commission, Final Report: De-
tails About the Accident 5-14 (Feb. 1990), available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/details.
cfm.
84. Ryan J. Strasser, Note, Punitive Damages Caps: A Proposed Middle Ground After Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 19 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 773, 774 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
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that could have far-reaching implications.85 Noted one commentator,
"The Exxon decision ostensibly affects only a narrow category of
cases. .. [however, while] the precise holding in Exxon may be nar-
row, the case is likely to have a substantial impact on the constitu-
tional dimension of punitive damages. . . ."86 In Hayduk v. City of
Johnstown,87 a federal court read the Exxon case in precisely those
terms: "Although Exxon is a maritime law case, it is clear that the
Supreme Court intends that its holding have a much broader
application."88
Whether the Exxon 1:1 ratio is extended beyond maritime cases in
the future is not yet clear. However, one thing is not a matter of spec-
ulation: in terms of damages, at the time of the Macondo well explo-
sion a mile below the Deepwater Horizon rig (a maritime event
ostensibly covered by Exxon), there was a 1:1 ratio on punitive dam-
ages and a $75 million cap on civil tort liability. That meant BP could
calculate immediately its total liability exposure and make critical
choices commensurate with that liability, unconcerned about the ef-
fect of its actions or the outrage they engendered. It is fair and logical
to assume that knowledge of these limits on liability affected the criti-
cal choices made by BP prior to the explosion that led to the worst
environmental disaster in U.S. history.
IV. BEYOND OIL SPILLS: CAPPING DAMAGES AND DETERRENCE,
SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND EFFICIENCY
A. Caps and Deterrence
While most of tort reform is predicated on the importance of open-
market functions and accountability for those who engage in miscon-
duct, when it comes to capping liability for certain privileged indus-
tries, open market theory vanishes. Instead of the normal pressures of
competition ensuring accountability for wrongdoing, industry protec-
tion becomes the norm. This argument is usually coupled with a claim
that if such unchecked liability exists, not only will participants in the
85. See generally Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical
Analysis Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 263, 278 (2006), and Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of
Punitive Damages Awards in Published Opinions, the Impact of BMW v. Gore on Punitive Dam-
ages Awards, and Forecasting Which Punitive Awards Will Be Reduced, 7 Sup. CT. EcoN. REV.
59, 75 (1999).
86. Michael L. Brooks, Note, Uncharted Waters: The Supreme Court Plots the Course to a
Constitutional Bright-Line Restriction on Punitive Awards in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 62
OKLA. L. REv. 497, 517-18 (2010).
87. Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d 429 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
88. Id. at 483-84 n.46.
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industry be disinclined to operate in the United States, but insurance
companies would be unwilling to accept the risk as well.
In field after field, this extortive rhetoric has become commonplace.
The argument is always the same: the prospect of limitless liability is
so grave and so real that unless Congress passes a law to limit or abol-
ish civil tort liability, the benefits of the industry will not be provided
to the citizens of the United States. The deterrent effect will have to
be compromised for the greater good, or so goes the argument. The
truth is, the greater good is compromised; victims are undercompen-
sated, deterrence is greatly lessened, and those who engage in miscon-
duct are rewarded. In the parlance of basic tort law, when an entity
engages in behavior that reflects a lack of due care and produces a
foreseeable harm, liability is imposed. This is a principle of historic
consequence. 89 The notion that a statute would limit liability for those
who engage in behavior that causes the precise accident foreseen is
deeply troubling. Writing about employment discrimination, George
Washington University Professor Michael Selmi wrote,
By their nature, damage caps are arbitrary and have no necessary
relation to the damage a company's discrimination is likely to cause
either to the immediate victims or to society at large, and as a result,
the damage caps almost certainly pose an additional restriction on
the law's deterrent effect.90
There is a simple truth with capped damages: They lessen the likeli-
hood of optimal safety and efficiency. The idea that caps have no ef-
fect on the manner in which goods and services are provided is untrue.
The presence of a cap will affect rational market actors with a per-
fectly predictable result: "Potential defendants may alter their behav-
ior because they know that their liability is limited. . . ."91 The tort
system is, in fact, all about deterrence. "Deterrence is the function of
tort law by which the law creates incentives that induce people to
89. As every first-year law student will recite, this is the classical, basic, and conservative foun-
dation for the imposition of full liability in the tort system. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162
N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports
relation . . . . "It [is] not necessary that the defendant should have had notice of the
particular method in which an accident would occur, if the possibility of an accident was
clear to the ordinarily prudent eye."
Id. (quoting Munsey v. Webb, 231 U.S. 150, 150 (1913)).
90. Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Dis-
crimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1249, 1315 (2003) (discussing caps on
liability in employment discrimination cases).
91. Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The Tension Between Legislative Power
and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345, 391 n.205 (1995).
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avoid inappropriately dangerous activities." 92 It is about communicat-
ing to the public the standards with which individuals, business, and
governments should conform. It is about communicating that there
will be consequences that the actor, not the actor's customers, will
have to bear. This is perhaps the most basic tenet not just of tort law
but of our entire legal system. Somehow, the principle seems to get
lost when discussing caps. It is time to put the basic premise back on
the table. The idea is simple: "Reduction of risk through deterrence
of harm is the true purpose of liability today . . . . 93 A cap that arbi-
trarily and artificially limits liability undermines that purpose. In
health care, for example, it is simply naive to believe that caps have no
effect on the quality of the practice of medicine.
Discussing a proposal to cap damages in the medical malpractice
area, one author noted that when "tortfeasors do not face liability for
the total economic and noneconomic damages, underdeterrence oc-
curs. By failing to internalize the full cost of harm, future actors en-
gage in unreasonably risky behavior, leading to an increase in negligent
conduct . . . [a]ffect[ing] the deterrence capability of the tort sys-
tem."94 In fact, caps compromise public safety. "A damage cap may
undermine the deterrence incentive provided by medical malpractice
liability. If quality of care and medical errors are elastic with respect
to the degree of liability, patients may be harmed by the introduction
of a liability cap." 95 A cap in the medical malpractice area makes it
more profitable
to face potential liability for medical malpractice rather than pro-
vide costly treatment that complies with the legal standard of
care.... [P]hysicians react to different sorts of financial incentives
in this way....
To summarize, if damage caps reduce exposure to liability, physi-
cians (and MCOs), on average, may be less likely to provide compli-
ant treatment. This will result in an increase in patient injuries
96
The loss of deterrence is a real and dramatic consequence of a cap on
damages across the board. Considering a cap on punitive damage lia-
bility in Alaska, a commentator noted,
92. Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms' Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care
and Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 910 (2008).
93. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAw 268 (2004).
94. Brandon Van Grack, The Medical Malpractice Liability Limitation Bill, 42 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 299, 311 (2005) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
95. David A. Matsa, Does Malpractice Liability Keep the Doctor Away? Evidence from Tort
Reform Damage Caps, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 176 (2007).
96. Kathryn Zeiler, Turning from Damage Caps to Information Disclosure: An Alternative to
Tort Reform, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETmics 385, 389-90 (2005).
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[C]apping punitive damages against employers who are found liable
for discriminatory acts sends the wrong message to those responsi-
ble for making employment decisions in Alaska. Managers and su-
pervisors who may be inclined to hire white males over equally
qualified African-American or Native-American females have been
given the signal by the Legislature that, if you get caught, your pun-
ishment will be limited, regardless of your size. Employers who may
wish to avoid promoting minority employees in order to preserve a
certain "corporate image" have been told that juries will be limited
in their ability to punish for this behavior.97
Damages imposed for wrongdoing, particularly those that cannot be
predicted in advance and passed along to consumers, are the deterrent
force in the civil justice system. Writing about punitive damages more
than a quarter century ago, the Colorado Supreme Court noted the
obvious: "If punitive damages are predictably certain, they become
just another item in the cost of doing business, much like other pro-
duction costs, and thereby induce a reluctance on the part of the man-
ufacturer to sacrifice profit by removing a correctible defect." 98
Discussing predictability as it relates to punitive damages, Professor
Michael Rustad wrote the following: "[C]aps . . . 'artificially and arbi-
trarily deflate punitive damages, no matter how egregious the defen-
dant's disregard of health and safety.' The arbitrary limitation of
punitive damages to the harm suffered by the plaintiff 'undermines
deterrence because the sanction is then limited to a predictable
amount of money.' 99 This fact alone allows for profit-maximizing be-
havior without the risk and critical disciplining effect of unplanned
exposure to liability. The risk of unplanned exposure provides a mar-
ket force of great consequence. It forces actors to consider the possi-
bility of harm and injury associated with product or service failure. It
pushes companies to optimize safety, within reasonable limits. This
pressure is absent with a cap on liability. 00
Unless one wishes to ignore the literature, it is apparent that caps
reduce the deterrent effect of the civil justice system, protect wrong-
doers who cause harm, and transgress the most basic rights associated
with civil justice, including the right to a jury trial. Professor Michael
97. Terry Venneberg, Legislature Modifies Tort Reform Statute, Caps Damages, ALASKA BAR
RAG, May-June 2008, at 1 (emphasis added).
98. Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 218 (Colo. 1984).
99. Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages' Iron Cage, 38 Lov. L.A. L. REV.
1297, 1318-19 (2005) (quoting Products Liability Reform Act of 1997: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Trans., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Lucinda M. Finley,
Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School); see also Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad,
"Crimtorts" as Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 289, 324-25 (1998).
100. See Galanter & Luban, supra note 81, at 1418-54 (arguing that caps undercut
deterrence).
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Rustad and Dr. Thomas Koenig state the problem succinctly: "Arbi-
trary caps limit the remedy's efficiency. Such caps permit a [corpora-
tion] to accurately predict its punishment in advance and to
incorporate that cost into the cost of doing business. Thus, corpora-
tions spread the costs to consumers rather than avoiding negligent be-
havior." 01 In one student note, the author comes to the same
conclusion: "Regardless of their constitutionality, statutory caps on
non-economic damages do not comport with everything we know
about our functioning tort system.. .. [L]egislators should find other
mechanisms to achieve societal goals of reduced damages and health
care costs."102 Unless everything that has ever been written about
sanctions for misconduct is wrong, caps undermine deterrence.
B. Caps and Social Justice
The theme of arbitrariness and the lack of beneficial effects is eve-
rywhere you turn in the caps literature. While at Harvard's School of
Public Health, Professor David Studdert came to the same conclusion:
"Decisions to implement [damage caps] should be made with an
awareness that they are likely to exacerbate existing problems of fair-
ness in compensation." 0 3
In terms of our belief in and entitlement to a trial by jury, caps are a
corrupting element. Robert Peck notes that "a cap exercises judicial
authority . . . rendering the jury's verdict advisory, rather than consti-
tutionally secured." 04 A somewhat similar theme is echoed in a Utah
Supreme Court opinion: "[I]t is self-evident that the cap on the quality
of life damages, which does nothing more than reduce [plaintiff's] re-
covery, does not provide a substitute remedy substantially equal to
that abrogated." 05 Caps, then, have the effect of diluting deterrence
as well as invading a fundamental right to a meaningful process to
recover for harms caused by the misconduct of another.106 Caps also
101. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil
Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 69 (2002).
102. Luke Ledbetter, "It's the [Tort System], Stupid": Consumer Deductibles: How to More
Equitably Distribute the Risks of Medical Malpractice and Adequately Compensate Victims With-
out Statutory Damage Caps, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 51, 72 (2006).
103. David Studdert et al., Are Damage Caps Regressive? A Study of Malpractice Jury Verdicts
in California, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRs 54, 65 (2004).
104. Robert S. Peck, Violating the Inviolate: Caps on Damages and the Right to Trial by Jury,
31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 307, 325 (2005); see also Robert S. Peck, Tort Reform's Threat to an
Independent Judiciary, 33 RUTGERs L.J. 835, 851-56 (2002).
105. Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 139 (Utah 2004).
106. See David Randolph Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional Attacks on
Medical Malpractice Laws, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 195, 205-06 (1985) (explaining that Arizona and
Montana view recovery as a fundamental right).
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have a disproportionate negative effect on some of the most vulnera-
ble plaintiff populations.
[C]apping noneconomic damages not only undermines the deterrent
effect of malpractice accountability, but also has a clear and decid-
edly adverse impact on minorities and their comparative recoveries
for negligently received medical injuries.
Other segments of the population are also adversely affected ...
[including] the elderly . . . and children . . . .107
An article on corporate liability in sports litigation comes to the same
conclusion: "[T]he most seriously injured are the ones who tradition-
ally are the least adequately compensated. Thus, damages caps not
only frustrate the compensation goal required by a system designed to
make someone whole, but prevent[ ] the system's equity goal."' 08
Focusing on medical malpractice, one writer concluded, "Capping
damages does not reduce malpractice premiums, decrease the filing of
'frivolous' lawsuits, lower healthcare costs, or increase patient access
to health care.... [S]tatutes capping damages do not curb the medical
malpractice crisis, but rather serve only to punish the blameless vic-
tims of malpractice."T0 9 This conclusion was echoed ten years earlier
in a piece by Dean Steven Salbu, who noted that statutory caps "make
little sense," because they are, by definition, arbitrary.110
In Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patient Compensation Fund,"' the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court found that a cap on noneconomic damages in med-
ical malpractice cases is unlikely to have any positive effect on
consumers. While the court did not address other caps in Wiscon-
sin,112 it found that caps do not further legitimize state purposes, hold-
ing that they do little but deny plaintiffs those resources to which they
are entitled and benefit those who have acted negligently.
[W]hen the legislature shifts the economic burden of medical mal-
practice from insurance companies and negligent health care prov-
107. Peck, supra note 104, at 340. For a similar perspective, see Lucinda M. Finley, The Hid-
den Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY LJ. 1263, 1264-66
(2004).
108. Gil B. Fried, Punitive Damages and Corporate Liability Analysis in Sports Litigation, 9
MARo. SPORTs L. REV. 45, 62-63 (1998).
109. W. Taylor Hale, Comment, A Critical Misdiagnosis: Re-Evaluating Louisiana's Medical
Malpractice Cap, 53 Loy. L. REV. 463, 493-94 (2007).
110. Steven R. Salbu, Developing Rational Punitive Damages Policies: Beyond the Constitu-
tion, 49 FLA. L. REv. 247, 299-300 (1997).
111. Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Compensation Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 489 (Wis.
2005).
112. The court held that the cap for medical malpractice, Wis. STAT. § 893.55(4)(d) (2006),
was unconstitutional. Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 491. That holding did not apply to other caps in
the Wisconsin statutory scheme. For example, Wis. STAT. §§ 655.017, 893.55(4)(f), applicable to
wrongful death cases, was unaffected by the Ferdon decision.
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iders to a small group of vulnerable, injured patients, the legislative
action does not appear rational.
Therefore, even if the .. . cap on noneconomic damages would re-
duce medical malpractice insurance premiums, this reduction would
have no effect on a consumer's health care costs. Accordingly,
there is no objectively reasonable basis to conclude that the .. . cap
justifies placing such a harsh burden on the most severely injured
medical malpractice victims, many of whom are children.
We agree with those courts that have determined that the correla-
tion between caps on noneconomic damages and the reduction of
medical malpractice premiums or overall health care costs is at best
indirect, weak, and remote ... 11
Ferdon recognizes the reality of caps: they affect those who have
been harmed and, in all likelihood, are in great need of the damages
they seek. Accordingly, some courts have found these statutes uncon-
stitutional because of equal protection problems, some because they
are seen as a "taking," and some because, as a matter of substantive
due process, a cap fails to advance a legitimate state interest. 114 For
example, in LeBron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, the Illinois Su-
preme Court held that caps were facially unconstitutional.'1 5 The
court found that automatic limits on liability are, by definition, arbi-
trary.116 There have also been process-based challenges such as At-
lanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C v. Nestlehutt"17 where the Georgia
Supreme Court found that caps on noneconomic damages violate the
constitutional right to a jury trial."18
113. Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 485, 466. The Ferdon court cited Martin v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d
70 (1995), and Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 168 (Ala. 1991). Moore stated,
"We conclude that the correlation between the damages cap imposed by § 6-5-544(b) and the
reduction of health care costs to the citizens of Alabama is, at best, indirect and remote." 592
So. 2d at 168. See also Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 836 (N.H. 1980) (holding that a damage
cap violated the New Hampshire Constitution's equal protection clause saying, "We find that the
necessary relationship between the legislative goal of rate reduction and the means chosen to
attain that goal is weak . . . ."); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 147 (Utah 2004) (Durham, J.,
dissenting) ("Discussing his landmark Harvard study on medical malpractice, Paul Weiler notes
the critical limitations of available evidence in determining the relationship between medical
malpractice litigation and insurance premiums and the inherent unfairness and high social cost of
damage caps as a response in the absence of any showing of their effectiveness.").
114. See generally Edwards, supra note 12, at 213 (providing a solid and thoughtful review of
select state cases assessing the constitutionality of caps); see also Joanne Doroshow & Amy Wid-
man, The Racial Implications of Tort Reform, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 161, 162 (2007) (argu-
ing that those least able to cover their losses are profoundly affected by artificial limits on
damages).
115. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem. Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 917 (Ill. 2010).
116. Id. at 905.
117. Atlantic Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010).
118. Id. at 224. There are of course a number of cases in which a state statute was upheld as
constitutional-but that does not address the question of whether caps are bad public policy.
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In a nutshell, because caps place arbitrary recovery limits on inno-
cent victims, a number of state courts have taken the difficult step of
declaring these statutes unconstitutional. Such decisions are never
made lightly-deference to legislative decisions embodied in statutes
is the norm. It is only when a statute is genuinely in conflict with basic
constitutional entitlements that such decisions are rendered. This ex-
ercise in judicial restraint and ultimately judicial action is reserved for
truly unfair laws, and caps are truly unfair.
C. Caps and Inefficiency
While those advocating for caps on civil liability argue that in the
long run, tort reform generally and caps specifically stimulate compe-
tition and innovation, encourage invention and creativity, and gener-
ate savings in the economy by reducing the size and number of awards
in tort cases,' 19 there is little evidence to that effect.120 In fact, there is
a paucity of literature responding to the stark reality that caps under-
mine deterrence, encourage cost-cutting, reward shortcuts in safety
and innovation, and under-compensate innocent, injured plaintiffs.
Therefore, caps do not provide for an efficient economic result.
On reflection, it would seem that the only consistent effect of caps
has been to reduce accountability of tortfeasors and increase profit-
ability of insurance carriers. Further, caps can create perverse incen-
tives in the settlement process for both under- and over-
See Ortiz, supra note 39, at 1309 (proffering that damage caps have a negative effect on con-
sumer well-being).
119. See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 4, at 202-04; Theresa M. Hottenroth, Lessons from Canada:
A Prescription for Medical Liability Reform, 13 Wis. INT'L L.J. 285, 293 (1994); W. Kip Viscusi,
Pain and Suffering: Damages in Search of a Sounder Rationale, 1 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 141,
165 (1996); Lee Harris & Jennifer Longo, Flexible Tort Reform, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y
61 (2007) (providing a general discussion of the topic of tort reform); James F. Tiu, Comment,
Challenging Medical Malpractice Damage Award Caps on Seventh Amendment Grounds: Attacks
in Search of a Rationale, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 213, 233-39 (1990) (arguing that liability caps are
constitutionally sound); see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CONFRONTING
THE NEw HEALTH CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS
ay FIXING OUR MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM 14-16 (July 24, 2002), available at http://www.aspe.
dhhs.gov/daltcp/reports/litrefm.pdf; Assessing the Need to Enact Medical Liability Reform: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong.
120-21 (2003) (statement of Donald J. Palmisano, President-elect, American Medical Associa-
tion). President George W. Bush, Remarks at High Point University in High Point, North Caro-
lina (July 25, 2002), available at http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/PDFgate.cgi?WAISdoc
ID=865690235366+0+2+0&WAISaction=retrieve (stating that there should be a $250,000 cap on
noneconomic damages as a matter of federal law).
120. "Although for the most part passing constitutional muster, these caps and multipliers,
regardless of their form ... exact enormous unwanted societal costs." Mitchell J. Nathanson, It's
the Economy (and Combined Ratio), Stupid: Examining the Medical Malpractice Litigation Crisis
Myth and the Factors Critical to Reform, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 1077, 1107 (2004).
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compensation. Jennifer K. Robbennolt assessed the psychological ef-
fect of caps and found that
caps may have the counterintuitive effects of increasing both the
size and variability of punitive damage awards in some cases. Psy-
chological theory suggests that caps on punitive damages may serve
to anchor the decisions of jurors ..... Thus, if jurors anchor on the
value of the cap, awards could, paradoxically, be pulled higher in
some cases.121
At best, there are raw savings in capping damages, but only if one
excludes the true and full costs of misconduct. After all, caps intro-
duce a predictable liability cost that defendants easily can shift into
the price charged for their goods and services. 122 The question is
whether such predictability, in the long run, produces higher levels of
safety and efficiency for goods and services-to which the answer is
clearly "no." Unless we are to engage in the fantasy that behavior is
not affected by the potential of accountability and punishment, there
is really no other conclusion that makes sense. To state this another
way, caps give primacy to profitability and limit the impact of risk
assessment.123 It is a dangerous calculus.
While this may seem harsh, in those jurisdictions that cap
noneconomic damages, short cuts and other risk-taking are assessed
based solely on fiscal reward for the tortfeasor. The reward has not
come in the form of across-the-board reductions in malpractice premi-
ums.124 Physician and attorney Freeman L. Farrow assesses the situa-
tion as follows: "[A]lthough studies have shown a significant impact of
caps on noneconomic damages on the size of damage awards in medi-
cal malpractice lawsuits, they have not shown a direct correlation be-
121. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implica-
tions for Reform, 50 Bure. L. REV. 103, 171 (2002).
122. See Andrew F. Popper, A One-Term Tort Reform Tale: Victimizing the Vulnerable, 35
HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 123, 125 (1998) ("[Tlort reformers have tried to limit civil litigation options,
reduce exposure to civil liability and enact legislation that allows industry to calculate its expo-
sure in advance and pass the cost on to the consumer in the prices of goods and services.").
123. See Faure & Hui, supra note 64, at 183, 205.
124. In some subsets of the practice of medicine in California, there is an argument that caps
have led to lower premiums based on a state tort reform bill. Rebecca Porter, The Truth About
Med-Mal Premiums, TRIAL, May 2004, at 41 (arguing that Proposition 103 was responsible for
containing medical malpractice premiums, not the state tort reform legislation); Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) of 1975, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2005).
See also Patricia J. Chupkovich, Comment, Statutory Caps: An Involuntary Contribution to the
Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis or a Reasonable Mechanism for Obtaining Affordable
Health Care?, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 337, 337 n.1 (1993). But see Jonathan J. Lewis,
Comment, Putting MICRA Under the Microscope: The Case for Repealing California Civil Code
Section 3333.1, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 173, 187-88 (2001).
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tween such caps and the cost of medical malpractice insurance
premiums or the cost of medical care in general." 125
Even if one were to buy into the cost-based argument for caps,
these limitations on recovery are, at best, a short-term fix with long-
term costs. A capped damages market is a less safe market-and that
means significant long-term costs. "Cap-based tort reform is like
stitching up a highly visible but innocuous scrape on a patient's face
while allowing a cancer to multiply and spread through the patient's
whole body." 126 Moreover, to believe that market participants behave
identically in settings where there are caps and those where there are
none is folly. 12 7
Scholars Janet Currie and W. Bentley McCloud took aim at caps in
medical malpractice cases and found, not surprisingly, that caps not
only have a negative effect on consumer interests but have also failed
to produce efficiencies in the field of obstetrics.128 Using physician
response and behavior as a guide to determine the efficacy of caps in
the health care fields, these reports conclude, quite bluntly, that "im-
posing caps on non-economic damages has negative effects."129
The literature suggests that caps on civil liability, pertaining particu-
larly to medical malpractice, present a grave risk to the patient com-
munity.130 One author noted, "Striking empirical studies show the
overall ineffectiveness of caps. Damage caps are largely based on the
unsubstantiated belief that large awards for pain and suffering make a
substantial contribution to insurance rates." 31 This research ana-
lyzed, among other things, studies of the insurance industry which
demonstrated that caps on noneconomic damages produced only mar-
ginal benefits to industry and "seem particularly cruel in that they pe-
125. Freeman L. Farrow, The Anti-patient Psychology of Health Courts: Prescriptions from a
Lawyer-Physician, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 188, 201 (2010). For similar views, see David Morrison,
In Search of Savings: Caps on Jury Verdicts Are Not a Solution to Health Care Crisis, 7 Lov.
CONSUMER L. REP. 141, 149 (1994) (showing that capping damages in Indiana failed to produce
any savings for the patient population); Jacqueline Ross, Note, Will States Protect Us, Equally,
from Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice Legislation?, 30 IND. L. REV. 575, 588 (1997).
126. Luke Ledbetter, Consumer Deductibles: How to Distribute More Equitably the Risks of
Medical Malpractice and Compensate Victims Adequately Without Statutory Damage Caps, 41
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J. 1141, 1151 (2006).
127. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages
Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 403 (2005).
128. Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth Out-
comes, 123 Q.J. OF EcoN. 795, 797, 810, 813 (2008).
129. Id. at 823.
130. Id.
131. Nevel M. Bilimoria, New Medicine for Medical Malpractice: The Empirical Truth About
Legislative Initiatives for Medical Malpractice Reform-Part II, 27 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 306,
307 (1994).
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nalize the plaintiffs who are the most severely injured patients, who
truly need the largest awards."' 3 2
Unless one is unwilling to make the obvious assumption that there
is a value in deterring misconduct, the economics of caps simply do
not add up.'33 "[S]tatutory caps operate to distort the price
tortfeasors must pay to engage in negligent conduct [and] such caps
will result in inefficient judicial outcomes." 34 "The extent to which a
firm is 'willing to pay' the punitive price for reprehensible production
activities is a function of the firm's isoquant and isocost functions. To
ignore these individual-specific functional relationships renders the
stated purpose of punitive damages, i.e., punishment and deterrence,
meaningless."13 5 At best, "the effectiveness of medical malpractice
caps is . .. in question."136 Professor Edward Kionka,137 a leading
scholar in the tort law field, noted that caps have only a limited effect
on insurance premiums and effectuate a definite deprivation for those
injured by negligent defendants.138
Not a single juried empirical study supports the proposition that a
cap on civil liability benefits consumers or increases the quality of
goods and services. It is only logical to conclude that caps distribute
losses away from wrongdoers, imposing on victims and taxpayers the
costs of misconduct. In the presence of a cap, the incentive to inno-
vate is based on profit, not safety and value and, in the long run, that
is highly inefficient. To conclude otherwise makes little sense.
V. CONCLUSION
A discussion about caps is, inevitably, a tort reform discussion.
For at least the last 25 years, tort reform has been front and center
on the U.S. political stage-it has been an issue in every presidential
election campaign since 1980 and a plank in every major party plat-
132. Id.
133. Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick Fitzgerald, Punitive Damages and the Supreme Court's Rea-
sonable Relationship Test: Ignoring the Economics of Deterrence, 19 ST. JoNm's J. LEGAL COM-
MENT. 237, 255-56, 258 (2005).
134. Id. at 258.
135. Id. at 256.
136. Michael S. Kenitz, Comment, Wisconsin's Caps on Noneconomic Damages in Medical
Malpractice Cases: Where Wisconsin Stands (and Should Stand) on "Tort Reform," 89 MARo. L.
REv. 601, 624 (2006).
137. See Edward J. Kionka, Things to Do (or Not) to Address the Medical Malpractice Insur-
ance Problem, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 469, 479 (2006).
138. Id. at 493-95; see also Patrick A. Salvi, Why Medical Malpractice Caps Are Wrong, 26 N.
ILL. U. L. REv. 553, 554 (2006).
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form since 1984. Law review articles number in the thousands and
newspaper pieces on the topic in the tens of thousands.139
Caps, like most aspects of tort reform, involve the very hard business
of accountability, and are central to the emergence of a troubling cul-
ture of non-accountability. 140
Limits on liability-or overt denials of responsibility when faced
with overwhelming evidence to the contrary-have insinuated them-
selves into our discourse. Denial of responsibility should not be a leg-
islatively imposed norm. Notwithstanding the obvious disincentives of
liability caps and the literature regarding their negative effect on de-
terrence, they continue to be supported by policymakers, perhaps be-
cause the political consequences of taking on those who support caps
is simply too great.
Caps on something as dangerous as an oil spill seem an obvious
mistake. In fact, caps in most instances have been demonstrated to be
a bad idea. They do nothing for consumers and create disincentives
for safer and more efficient goods. It is simply an illusion that they
improve the marketplace for goods and services or enhance public
safety. The consequences of limiting liability can be devastating and
deadly. While the data is not yet conclusive, a strong case can be
made that a lack of due care, made more likely by capped liability and
a 1:1 compensatory to punitive damage ratio, affected the choices
made by BP leading to the Deepwater Horizon disaster.
It is time to think seriously about repealing caps on civil liability. It
will take generations for the Gulf of Mexico to recover from the rup-
ture of the Macondo well-the ecosystems in the Gulf and the com-
merce of the Gulf certainly will not survive another.
139. ANDREW POPPER, MATERIALS ON TORT REFORM (2010).
140. Consider the statements of the president of Toyota of Japan, who appeared before the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform last year. He said he was "very sorry" that
the company had not dealt with the serious and dangerous design failures in their vehicles and
sorry it had not responded to customer complaints. What he did not say was "this is our fault
and we are legally accountable." Toyota's President Apologizes for Massive Global Recalls, JA-
PAN TODAY (Feb. 6, 2010, 2:13 AM), http://www.japantoday.com/categorylbusiness/view/toyotas-
president-apologizes-for-massive-global-recalls. On the "gentle" claim from Toyota that the
thousands of incidents are actually the fault of consumers guilty of "pedal misapplication," see
Hiroko Tabuchi, Gas-and-Brake Pedal Gets New Look After Recalls, N.Y. TIMEs ONLINE (Aug.
3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/04/business/global/04pedal.html.
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